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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, JUSTICE, 
ETIDCS, AND ZEAL 
Darryl K. Brown* 
William Stuntz's recent article, The Uneasy Relationship 
Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice,1 offers a series of 
thoughtful observations on the reasons that criminal procedure doc­
trines designed to protect defendants have done so little to improve 
the criminal justice system. Stuntz's article describes the unin­
tended effects of attempts by the United States Supreme Court to 
improve criminal justice by closely regulating criminal procedure. 
That procedural focus has had perverse effects because, in a dy­
namic criminal justice system, other institutional players have re­
sponded to procedural rules in ways that undermine appellate 
courts' goals. Specifically, legislatures have reacted by expanding 
substantive �riminal law - which the Court chose not to regulate 
under the Due Process Clause - and by underfunding criminal de­
fense (as well as prosecution offices). That reaction was especially 
strong because increased procedural regulation coincided with a 
dramatic increase in crime beginning in the 1960s, which further 
encouraged legislative reaction to antimajoritarian court decisions 
that favored defendants. 
Prosecutors, for their part, may react to procedural rules that 
increase prosecution costs by shifting efforts away from prosecuting 
wealthier defendants - who can afford to invoke the procedural 
rights as defense mechanisms - and toward poorer ones, or by for­
going prosecutions of clearly guilty suspects with strong procedural 
arguments for those with weaker procedural claims. Neither basis 
relates to the defendant's factual guilt, so less guilty suspects may 
receive more attention than more guilty ones.2 Comparably, 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Dayton. B.A. 1984, East Carolina; M.A. 
{American Studies) 1990, William and Mary; J.D. 1990, University of Virginia. -Ed. 
1. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal 
Justice, 107 YALE LJ. 1 (1997). 
2. Dan Richman recently made a related argument about the effect on prosecutorial ac­
countability of a decision regulating criminal evidence. See Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. 
United States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial Accountability?, 83 VA. L. REv. 939 (1997). 
He argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 
{1997), which grants defendants the right to stipulate to a prior conviction when charged with 
possession of a gun by a felon, has subtle but important effects on prosecutorial discretion 
about charging decisions (and also on jury decisions). In particular, if prosecutors seek solely 
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defense attorneys may respond to funding cuts and to new proce­
dural rights by allocating their limited time to procedural claims 
rather than factual investigation that goes to the substance of a cli­
ent's defense. Stuntz's central point, as I take it, is to explain how, 
given a dynamic set of institutions, increased appellate court regula­
tion of procedure has done little to improve criminal justice and 
thus merits rethinking.3 Perversely, he notes, the response to pro­
cedural regulation poses special risks to poor and innocent 
defendants. 
Stuntz's article illuminates the difficulty appellate courts face in 
regulating criminal justice through procedural devices because of 
their inability to anticipate and control reactions by other institu­
tions. That inability stems in large part from the choice not to regu­
late criminal justice more directly by constraining crime definition, 
setting minimum funding levels, and enforcing a more rigorous defi­
nition of adequate representation. Within this discussion of institu­
tional relationships, however, the article also has a lot to say -
more than the article's emphasis may initially reveal - about stra­
tegic attorney decisionmaking in a dynamic context of scarce re­
sources. The analysis suggests the need for more attention to a 
broad array of contextual factors - doctrinal, financial, political, 
and institutional - that affect lawyers' strategic decisionmaking in 
ways insufficiently appreciated. I would like to draw out a few of 
the implications of Stuntz's analysis with regard to the tension be­
tween structural conditions of practice, notions of professionalism, 
and the ways we train lawyers with little attention to the context of 
practice. For brevity, I will focus on defense attorneys. 
Recent discussions on the ethics of criminal defense recognize 
the scarcity of resources under which both sides work, particularly 
in state courts. William Simon and David Luban's exchange on this 
topic is especially notable.4 Simon argues that defense lawyers 
to maximize conviction rates (a debatable assumption), the Old Chief rule may make prose­
cutors indifferent to the defendant's prior record or future dangerousness and more con­
scious of racial and class factors that could make conviction more likely. In a more limited 
way, then, Richman's argument identifies not only the effect of rule changes on strategic 
lawyering decisions (a well-known effect), but also the way such rule changes can have differ­
ent effects systemically (over a large class of cases managed by an attorney) than they do in 
an isolated, individual case, where the Old Chief rule may improve fairness by removing the 
prejudicial effect of proof about a prior felony. 
3. See Stuntz, supra note 1, at 52-74. Part III of the article argues that current judicial­
legislative dynamics push courts to create too many procedural rules and legislatures to de­
fine crimes too broadly. Part IV discusses an alternative arrangement in which courts might 
regulate substantive criminal law and the funding of defense counsel more rigorously. 
4. See William H. Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. R:Ev. 1703 (1993) 
[hereinafter Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense]; David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders 
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should recognize and accept their ethical discretion to moderate 
tactics of "aggressive defense" when they know such tactics do not 
serve substantive justice - that is, when they have more reliable 
information than the factfinder has that the client is guilty. Luban 
objects to this use of discretion and urges instead a categorical rule 
of aggressive defense for virtually all clients.s Both acknowledge 
that prosecutors and defenders work in a world of heavy case loads 
and limited resources that compel trade-offs between the degrees of 
zeal an attorney gives different cases. Yet Simon argues that ag­
gressive defense for clients whom the attorney knows to be guilty 
forces more resources on both sides to that client's case, leaving 
fewer resources for cases in which the defendant's guilt is in some 
doubt - precisely the cases that, in order to protect the innocent, 
need to be litigated more carefully.6 
What is striking about this debate, in light of Stuntz's account, is 
the definition of aggressive defense that Simon and Luban share. 
Neither suggests that an attorney has discretion to forgo either a 
full litigation of procedural rights or a thorough factual investiga­
tion. The debate is restricted largely to whether attorneys should 
use tactics unconnected to truth determination or rights vindication 
in order to win. Simon argues only that lawyers should allow sub­
stantive justice to inform their discretionary decisions whether to 
delay litigation in hopes of exhausting state witnesses, present client 
perjury, impeach state testimony they know to be true, argue fac­
tual inferences they know to be false, or use "greymail" tactics of 
·threatening to disclose information unrelated to the merits of the 
case but injurious or embarrassing to the state or its witnesses.7 
Neither addresses the sort of discretionary decisionmaking that 
Stuntz's description implies is a significant choice for defense attor­
neys and that my participatory observation of state court practice 
confirms. The choices defenders in fact make are often whether to 
allocate scarce resources to procedural claims or factual investiga­
tion, and how much of both to forgo in exchange for a plea 
bargain.8 
Different?, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1729 {1993); William H. Simon, Reply: Further Reflections on 
Libertarian Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1767 (1993) [hereinafter Simon, Further 
Reflections]. 
5. Prosecutors, of course, already have a well-established duty of such ethical discretion; 
their mandate is to serve justice rather than seek a maximum conviction in every case. 
6. See Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, supra note 4, at 1712-13. 
7. See id. at 1703-05. 
8. See JONATHAN D. CAS PER, CRIMINAL CouRTS: THE DEFENDANT'S PERSPECTIVE 35 
tbl.VI-5 (1978) (stating that 59% of public defenders spend less than half an hour with cli­
ents); Marty Lieberman, Investigation of Facts in Preparation for Plea Bargaining, 1981 Aruz. 
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The fact that indigent defense is often inadequate is hardly 
news. The reasons for consistently sub-par lawyering, however, 
may be misunderstood, at least outside the death penalty context.9 
Some discussions imply the cause is largely that defenders are sim­
ply lazy, unmotivated, or lack sufficient skills.10 When the issue 
arises of how attorneys allocate scarce resources, ethics discussions 
- of which Simon and Luban's is among the best - often debate 
about rationing time and effort only in terms of aggressive defense 
tactics. Though Simon and Luban recognize the severe resource 
constraints that practitioners face in state criminal courts, they offer 
no real advice on mediating choices between basic tasks like thor­
ough investigation and utilization of all procedural claims.11 Yet, as 
Stuntz makes clear, resource scarcity is sufficiently great in many 
settings that attorneys must trade off practices more basic than ag­
gressive techniques - often practices related to important fact in­
vestigation. Given the scarcity of their time, attorneys cannot meet 
their professional obligations solely by rationing aggressive defense 
tactics or sustaining high levels of zeal. They must also ration fact 
investigation, and perhaps procedural litigation as well. 
Attorneys mediate choices imposed by the material conditions 
of practice within the current justice system. What we might call 
the political economy of criminal practice is a key determinant of 
attorney performance and the quality of client representation. Pro­
fessionalism literature offers little guidance on the choices attorneys 
must make within the real-life parameters set by the economy of 
ST. L.J. 557, 576 (discussing a study of Phoenix, Arizona attorneys, which found that 47% of 
surveyed defense attorneys entered plea agreements without interviewing any state wit­
nesses); see also Luban, supra note 4, at 1735 (discussing these studies); Margaret L. Steiner, 
Adequacy of Fact Investigation in Criminal Defense Lawyers' Trial Preparation, 1981 Aruz. 
ST. L.J. 523, 534, 537 (discussing a similar study in Phoenix, which found that only 55% 
visited felony crime scenes before trial and only 31 % interviewed all state witnesses). 
9. Michael Mello's new book, Dead Wrong, provides an example of an attorney who 
came to the conclusion, after years of practice, that high-quality lawyering could not over­
come the structure of a criminal justice system in which injustice is endemic. The conclusion 
is controversial as well as painful, because Mello concedes that skilled and zealous lawyering 
can make differences in individual cases. But those cases occur in a system that makes unjust 
outcomes inevitable in innumerable other cases, and the remedy for that problem is struc­
tural, not individual. See MICHAEL A. MELLO, DEAD WRONG 200-04 (1997). 
10. See, e.g., David Lynch, The Impropriety of Plea Agreements: A Tale of Two Counties, 
19 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 115 (1994); see also Simon, Further Reflections, supra note 4, at 1771 
(noting "the real problem" is that "most defendants do not get even the attention and effort 
to which they would be entitled under far more conservative theories of defense," but not 
specifying whether that is due to resource scarcity, attorney laziness, or both). 
11. See, for example, Luban, supra note 4, at 1765, where Luban acknowledges a public 
defender's "caseload and resources [may] make it impossible for . .. her to offer capable 
defense in every case." His advice is to focus on "clients who are in greater jeopardy and 
who are less dangerous" and to encourage "aggressive advocacy." 
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practice. Instead of addressing the strategic and ethical implica­
tions of these unavoidable choices, we rely on the dictates of profes­
sionalism to urge lawyers to overcome them. By force of will, 
attorneys must overcome material constraints to meet ethical 
obligations. 
This tension between aspirational goals and the structural set­
ting in which practitioners must fulfill those goals connects with 
broader observations - touched on recently by Mark Tushnet in a 
review essay12 - about changes in the political economy of the 
"professional-managerial class" since roughly the 1970s, when the 
post-World War II economic boom began to wane. With reference 
to the legal community, Tushnet observes that laments about the 
practice of law evolving from a profession to a mere business corre­
late with the relative contraction and increased competitiveness of 
the economy. That correlation suggests that the ethics of profes­
sionalism are contingent upon an economy that allows practitioners 
to forgo some basic cost and profit concerns in the name of profes­
sional standards. When material conditions no longer support such 
behavior without cost, exhortations to high ethical standards and 
zealous, client-�entered counseling are insufficient to maintain 
those practices. i3 
The institutional settings in which attorneys practice likely have 
all sorts of implications for the professional habits they develop and 
strategic choices they make, many of which may go unexamined.14 
12. See Mark Tushnet, A Public Philosophy for the Professional-Managerial Class, 106 
YALE L.J. 1571 (1997) (book review); see also John S. Elson, Why and How the Practicing 
Bar Must Rescue American Legal Education from the Misguided Priorities of American Legal 
Academia, 64 TENN. L. RE.v. 1135, 1138 (1997) (noting that "trends toward a far more com­
petitive legal services market" contribute to a practice context that inadequately trains new 
lawyers and sends them "mixed messages . . .  as to their duties of competent practice, client 
loyalty, community service, and basic honesty"). 
13. This description fits within a larger portrait of the profit squeeze faced by the corpo­
rate sector since the early 1970s, when corporations began to look for ways to fight declining 
profits. In addition to opposing unions, taxation, and regulation more vigorously, firms 
sought increasingly to squeeze more work from fewer workers by extending work hours, and 
to cut the cost of workers by hiring more part-time workers for lower wages and no benefits. 
We might view this response as an analogy to the legal profession's much-lamented transition 
from a profession to a business. Just as corporations considered themselves no longer able to 
afford the impositions of the welfare and regulatory state, law firms began to experience 
competitive pressures and a profit squeeze that prompted responses such as longer attorney 
work hours and other cost-cutting tactics. See Harry Edwards, The Growing Disjunction 
Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. RE.v. 34 (1992); Elson, supra 
note 12, at 1138. 
14. That problem raises an ethical issue that often varies in practice from how it is for· 
mally taught in law school. The rule that students learn is that one may not trade off the 
interests of one client or case for another; each deserves the attorney's full, uncompromised 
commitment. The reality is that attorneys frequently must choose the cases in which they will 
invest resources. 
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That description suggests an additional emphasis for the study and 
teaching of professionalism and lawyer decisionmaking. Particu­
larly in practice settings characterized by severe resource scarcity, 
. new attorneys should be made acutely aware of the context of their 
strategic decisionmaking, recognize that they are rationing very lim­
ited resources, and consider the feasibility of giving priority to fact 
investigation and other merits-based lawyering tasks.15 
We can draw insights from the behavioral science of choice the­
ory to understand lawyer decisionmaking in a criminal justice sys­
tem that offers procedural claims, demands for informal factual 
investigation, a ubiquitous custom of plea bargaining, and con­
strained resources. Behavioral scientists find that decisions in a 
wide range of settings are often "context-dependent" in ways that 
one would not predict from the merits of the options with which 
one is presented.16 Much of this research began with the study of 
consumer behavior. For example, a $100 camera usually appears 
more appealing to buyers when contrasted with both a $200 camera 
and a $50 camera than it does when it is set solely against the $200 
option. This "compromise effect" describes the common prefer­
ence for a choice presented as an intermediate alternative over the 
same option when it is presented as an extreme. Relatedly, a "con­
trast effect" occurs when the same option seems more appealing if 
presented with options clearly inferior to it than when it is 
presented without those alternatives. So, for example, people tend 
to choose a Cross pen less often when they are offered a choice 
solely between it and $6 cash than when offered the Cross pen, $6, 
or an inferior pen. The contrast with the lesser product somehow 
makes the Cross pen more appealing, though the pen itself - and 
the consumer's information about it - remains unchanged. 
Choice theory has been applied relatively little in legal contexts; 
when it is explored, the focus is largely on potential judge or jury 
decisionmaking.17 But choice theory suggests explanations for 
15. We might infer from the existing focus of legal education that lawyers practice in a 
fairly prosperous private firm or a well-funded government office such as the U.S. Justice 
Department. Limited resources affect practice decisions in those settings - that is where 
current laments about the shift of law from a profession to a mere business arise - but not 
on a scope remotely related to the effect in critically underfunded state defender and prose­
cutor offices. At some point, the difference in degree becomes a difference in kind that 
requires specific attention to how lawyering must accommodate a context that virtually pro­
hibits high-quality practice. 
16. See Mark Kelman et al. , Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making, 25 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 287 (1996); Amos Tversky & Itamar Simonson, Context-Dependent Preferences, 39 
MGMT. Sci. 1179 {1993). 
17. For an excellent recent article representing one of the first efforts to apply this re­
search to legal decisionmaking, see Kelman et al., supra note 16 (citing the examples of the 
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strategic attorney decisionmaking within the context of the existing 
criminal justice practice, which may partially follow similar patterns 
despite the dictates of professionalism. Consider, for example, our 
hypothetical, overworked public defender facing the choices Stuntz 
describes. She has a plausible suppression motion, a need for con­
siderable investigation (witness interviews, scientific tests) that can 
be done with varying degrees of thoroughness, and a standard plea 
bargain offer from the prosecutor that is a substantial discount from 
the likely sentence based on a full conviction at trial. We can view 
the attorney's options as: (1) urging a plea after minimal investiga­
tion (interviewing the client, reviewing the prosecutor's file); (2) 
undertaking a minimal investigation plus raising a procedural claim 
evident from that investigation; or (3) pursuing the procedural 
claim plus a time-consuming, full investigation. Without resource 
constraints, we assume professionalism would overcome the com­
promise effect that makes option two a plausible choice; a diligent 
attorney would choose option three. But resources are limited. 
This case is one of many requiring fairly quick attention, several of 
which pose the same choices. In this context, the compromise effect 
is more likely; the procedural claim and minimal investigation may 
seem the most appealing way to distribute the scarce resource of 
attorney effort. Pressures of context overcome the dictates of pro­
fessionalism; the political economy of practice shifts the range of 
acceptable behavior. 
Alternatively, we might suspect this situation could prompt a 
contrast effect. Pursuing only a procedural claim and minimal in­
vestigation should seem an unappealing option. It conflicts too 
sharply with background notions of professionalism. But con­
trasted against a case with no procedural claim for which one does 
only minimal investigation - a practice choice the attorney has 
likely observed in this setting - pursuing only a procedural claim 
and minimal investigation starts to look more defensible. Minimal 
investigation alone, after all, means one does virtually nothing for a 
client other than present an ill-informed judgment about a plea bar­
gain. But if minimal investigation alone contrasts with a procedural 
claim option, by choosing the latter the attorney at least does some­
thing for the client - something, in fact, that may get the case 
dismissed. 
Cross pen and camera experiments discussed above); see also Russell Korobkin & Chris 
Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 
TEXAS L. REv. 77, 95 (1977) (discussing related psychological research as an explanation for 
settlement behavior in civil cases). 
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Again, unlike consumer behavior, attorney performance is 
somewhat guided by professionalism norms that should counteract 
some effects of context dependence. Yet the resource constraints of 
practice gradually modify background assumptions of professional 
conduct, making the contrast with professionalism less stark, and 
the minimal investigation approach more acceptable. Relying on 
recent insights from theories of norms18 and social infl.uence19 to 
explain criminal, legal, and other social behavior, we might expect 
that regular players in local courts revise professionalism norms 
downward - to accommodate scarce resources - by not holding 
their colleagues in low esteem for cutting corners. Indeed, they 
may reward with high esteem those who help the system run 
quickly with minimal litigation effort.20 The calculus involving pro­
fessionalism, material constraints, and norms becomes even more 
complex when one considers additional factors that attorneys jug­
gle, consciously or not. Those include experienced intuition about 
the strength of a procedural claim in a given forum; hunches about 
outcomes of investigation efforts or other factors that affect judg­
ment of trial success (including the class and race of parties, which 
may affect credibility judgments);21 and trade-offs among cases, so 
that one can put more effort into a few especially worthy cases. The 
insights of choice theory, set in a system of constrained resources, 
suggest how systemic pressures work at the behavioral level to 
make inadequate practice seem to meet working definitions of pro­
fessionalism, in large part because long-term practice constraints 
have gutted the formal content of written standards.22 
18. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 
96 MICH. L. REv. 338 (1997) (offering an "esteem theory" of norm development); see also 
Daniel Kahneman, Reference Points, Anchors, Norms, and Mixed Feelings, 51 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECIS ION PROCESSES 296, 307-08 (1992) (noting that 
behavior is judged more acceptable as it becomes more frequent and when contrasted with 
worse alternatives). 
19. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. 
REv. 349, 352-61 (1997) ("The concept of social influence . . .  [explains] that individuals tend 
to conform their conduct to that of other individuals."). 
20. A first-person account by a scholar who was formerly both a prosecutor and defender 
suggests this to be the case. See Lynch, supra note 10; see also Luban, supra note 4, at 1745 
("[W]idespread practices of perfunctory advocacy on the part of defenders exert enormous 
gravitational force . . . even when a defense counsel wants to do a job that is not 
perfunctory."). 
21. See Richman, supra note 2. 
22. See Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, Arenas of Professionalism: The 
Professional Ideologies of Lawyers in Context, in LAWYERS' lDEALSILAWYERs' PRACTICES 
177, 198-202, 211-14 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992) (describing how "[w]orkplace con­
texts develop widely varying and often mutually contradictory 'local versions' of 
professionalism"). 
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We can do a better job of developing a more sophisticated un­
derstanding of the varied institutional dynamics of practice settings, 
and of working to integrate that knowledge into lawyer training. 
Compare our knowledge of, say, the legislation process to our 
knowledge of advocacy practice. Legal and political science schol­
ars have developed a very sophisticated description of legislatures 
in action built on the insights of game theory, empirical and histori­
cal research, and various modes of legal scholarship. Far from 
describing legislators as merely civic-minded agents voicing the 
views of their constituent majorities in a process that yields out­
comes reflecting a majority of the agents' votes, we understand the 
disproportionate influence of small but extremely committed inter­
est groups, the practice of logrolling, the effect of agenda­
controlling procedural rules on substantive outcomes, and voting 
structures that yield an illusory majority preference among multiple 
options.23 
Our understanding of law practice in resource-starved settings 
like state criminal courts is not nearly as complex, and the focus of 
legal pedagogy reflects that. Once we recognize that attorneys may 
make strategic choices with important substantive consequences 
among basic advocacy tasks as well as among tasks that define the 
outer boundaries of zeal, we see a need for more guidance (and 
self-awareness) of those decisions. Simon has provided some of the 
most insightful commentary on the substance of discretionary lawy­
ering decisions.24 We need comparable insights with regard to the 
forced choices among basic advocacy tasks, if such ethical guidance 
is feasible in contexts of excessive scarcity. Stuntz provides a com­
pelling description of how those decisions are likely to be made 
without changes in circumstances or - just perhaps - attorney 
training. 
Legal education may be built upon an implicit bias - the model 
of attorneys practicing in comparatively prosperous settings such as 
23. See, e.g., KENNETH J. ARRow, SocIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 46·60 (2d 
ed. 1963); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIPP. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRmCAL 
lNrnODUCDON 38-62 (1991) (explaining Arrow's Theorem); DENNIS MUELLER, PUBLIC 
CHOICE II 63-65, 87-89 {1989); Darryl K. Brown, Structure and Relationship in the 
Jurisprudence of Juries: Comparing the Capital Sentencing and Punitive Damages Doctrines, 
47 HAST. L.J. 1255, 1277-81 {1996) (reviewing criticisms of legislatures); Richard H. Pildes & 
Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Plural­
ism, and Democratic Politics, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 2121, 2128-37 {1990) (reviewing literature 
and criticizing public choice theory critiques of democratic processes). 
24. In addition to Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, supra note 4, see William H. 
Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1083 {1988); see also Deborah L. 
Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REv. 589 (1985). 
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corporate firms, where resource constraints and the professional di­
lemmas they create are less stark. Legal scholarship and teaching 
need to give more guidance to new attorneys about how to mediate 
the conflicts between practice conditions and professional stan­
dards. By assuming ethical edicts alone will compel attorneys to 
overcome structural barriers to competent practice, we risk facili­
tating practices that aggravate the disconnection between case out­
comes and substantive merits. I suspect there are many 
practitioners who do not realize that the triage methods they have 
adopted in strained practice settings are causing them to make the 
choices Stuntz identifies: to choose procedural claims over fact­
intensive merit claims, and - I would suggest at least as strongly as 
Stuntz - to choose plea bargains over plausible procedural claims. 
Closer attention to contextual pressures and the practices they en­
gender may help scholars and teachers better prepare attorneys for 
the tremendous transition from acontextual, slow-motion study of 
practice in law schools to the real-world political economy of client 
representation. 
